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INSURANCE LAW - DUTY TO INDEMNIFY AND TO DEFEND - EACH
INSURER WHICH PROVIDES COVERAGE DURING WORKER'S ExPOsURE TO
ASBESTOS IS PROPORTIONATELY AND INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE TO
DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY ITS INSURED.
Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.
(6th Cir. 1980)
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. (Forty-Eight), a manufacturer of asbes-
tos products,' was named as a party-defendant in over one thousand
asbestos-related lawsuits. 2 The plaintiffs alleged that they suffered from
asbestos-related injuries 8 caused by exposure to Forty-Eight's products
during the course of their employment.4 Beginning in 1955, Forty-Eight
purchased Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) insurance 5 to protect
1. Insurance Co. of N. America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1980). Forty-Eight began selling products containing
asbestos in 1923. Insurance Co. of N. America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,
451 F. Supp. 1230, 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Forty-Eight manufactured and sold
cement and insulation blocks which contained asbestos for use on boilers, pipes,
elbows, flat surfaces and fittings beginning in 1923. Id. In 1970, Forty-Eight
discontinued the use of asbestos in its products. Id.
2. 633 F.2d at 1215. By May 4, 1978, Forty-Eight had been named as a
party-defendant in 251 asbestos lawsuits. Id. One year later, 1,370 asbestos
lawsuits had been commenced against the company. Id. The number was
representative of the avalanche of lawsuits filed against the asbestos manufac-
turing industry over the past five years. See id. For a discussion of the asbestos
disease litigation, see notes 15-26 and accompanying text infra.
3. 633 F.2d at 1214 & n.1. Asbestos-related diseases include asbestosis,
mesothelioma and bronchogenic carcinoma. For a discussion of the asbestos-
related diseases which have given rise to personal injury suits throughout the
nation, see notes 15-26 and accompanying text infra.
4. See 633 F.2d at 1217-18. The plaintiffs, on behalf of their decedents or
on their own behalf, claimed to have suffered injury or death from asbestos-
caused lung diseases caused by exposure to asbestos products manufactured by
Forty-Eight. 451 F. Supp. at 1233. The underlying suits were commenced
against all manufacturers or suppliers, including Forty-Eight, whose asbestos
products were used at the sites at which the workers were employed. See
Mansfield, Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 F. 860, 865-66(Summer 1980). For a discussion of the asbestos disease litigation and the
various legal theories used in multi-party litigation, see notes 22-26 and accom-
panying text infra. The quantity of asbestos particles from Forty-Eight's
products to which a worker was exposed cannot be certain. 451 F. Supp. at
1233. In these cases, it is possible that Forty-Eight and any or all of the named
party-defendant manufacturers may be held liable for damages. See 633 F.2d
at 1215 n.3; Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1095-96(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAw OF TORTS § 52, at 315-20 (4th ed. 1971). For a brief review of the
development of joint and several tort liability into an "enterprise" theory of
liability, see note 26 infra.
5. 633 F.2d at 1215. The policies taken out by Forty-Eight contained pro-
visions which were widely used in CGL insurance policies. Id. at 1215-16. In
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itself against product liability judgments.0 The Insurance Company of
North America (INA) - which had insured Forty-Eight for the longest
period of all of the insurers 7- disclaimed any duty to defend or in-
demnify Forty-Eight for lawsuits alleging asbestos-related injuries mani-
fested after the expiration date of INA's final policy.6
INA sought declaratory judgments in the United States District
Courts for the Northern District of Ohio and the Eastern District of
Michigan 9 against Forty-Eight and four other insurance carriers of Forty-
Eight 10 defining its duty to defend and indemnify the manufacturer in
effect, an insurer, under a CGL policy, contractually agrees to pay on behalf of
an insured such damages which result due to "bodily injury" caused by an
"occurrence" during the policy period. See 451 F. Supp. at 1238; Mansfield,
supra note 4, at 875. In the INA policy during the period of October 31, 1967
until October 31, 1972, the insurance agreement, policy period and definitions
provisions stated:
This policy applies only to bodily injury . . . which occurs during
the policy period ...
To pay on behalf of insured . . . as damages because of bodily in-
jury . . . caused by an occurrence....
Bodily injury means bodily injury, sickness or disease ....
As respects property damage liability occurrence means an accident,
including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the
policy perio, in property damage neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured.
633 F.2d at 1228, app. B.
6. 633 F.2d at 1215-16. Prior to 1955, Forty-Eight did not show coverage.
Id. & 1215 n.4. From October 31, 1955 until October 31, 1972, the Insurance
Company of North America (INA) insured Forty-Eight with six consecutive in-
surance policies, with varying coverage limits. Id. at 1215. From October 31,
1972 until January 10, 1975, Forty-Eight was insured by Affiliated FM Insurance
Company (Affiliated FM). Id. Illinois National Insurance Company (Illinois
National) insured Forty-Eight from January 10, 1975 until January 12, 1976
and Travelers Indemnity Company of Rhode Island (Travelers) issued policies
to Forty-Eight from January 12, 1976 until November 8, 1976. Id. Since
November 8, 1976, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) has
been Forty-Eight's insurance carrier. Id. The coverage range increased over
the three decades, and the current policy with Liberty Mutual includes a
$100,000.00 per person deductible for asbestosis claims. Id. at 1215-16 n.6 &c
1227, app. A. For various provisions of the pertinent policies and their coverage
clauses, see id. at 1227-28, app. B; note 5 supra.
7. See note 6 supra. For the relevant provisions of INA's policies, see 633
F.2d at 1227-28, app. A & B.
8. 451 F. Supp. at 1236. INA intended its disclaimer to apply to all law-
suits filed after June 27, 1977 in which a complaint alleged tat an asbestos-
related disease manifested itself after October 31, 1972. Id. INA's final policy
expired on October 31, 1972. Id.
9. Id. The Michigan District Court noted that it had jurisdiction over
this case by reason of diversity of citizenship. Id. at 1232. The Ohio action
was adjourned pending the determination of the instant declaratory judgment
action in the Eastern District of Michigan. Id. at 1238.
10. Id. at 1236. See note 6 supra for a review of Forty-Eight's insurance
carriers. This action would determine Forty-Eight's carrier's duties to defend
1980-81] 108I
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the numerous pending asbestos lawsuits.11 The district court determined
that the insurers provided coverage during the time that the plaintiffs
were allegedly exposed to Forty-Eight's products were obligated to in-
demnify and defend Forty-Eight, even though the asbestos-related disease
did not manifest itself during the insurer's period of coverage.' 2 On
appeal, 18 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 14
affirmed, holding that each insurer which provides coverage during a
worker's exposure to asbestos is proportionately and individually liable
and indemnify. 633 F.2d at 1213-14. For purposes of the declaratory judgment
action, Forty-Eight was considered self-insured prior to 1955 since no records of
coverage before that date were presented. See 451 F. Supp. at 1233 n.l.
11. 451 F. Supp. at 1233. The central question was whether coverage at-
tached at the time the disease manifested itself or at the time of exposure. Id.
The dates that coverage attaches were considered relevant because of the pos-
sibility that several carriers may be held liable for indemnification under the
exposure theory. Since Forty-Eight may have had several carriers during the
dates that a plaintiff was exposed to Forty-Eight's products. Id. at 1233-36 &
1239-43. On the other hand, only one insurer would be held liable to defend
and indemnify Forty-Eight under a manifestation theory since these duties
attach on the date that an asbestos disease manifests. Id. For a discussion of
the peculiarities of asbestos-related diseases which give rise to these theories of
liability, see notes 15-21 and accompanying text inIra.
INA, along with Affiliated FM, Illinois National and Liberty Mutual advo-
cated the application of the manifestation theory of liability. 451 F. Supp. at
1233. For a discussion of the manifestation theory of liabiltiy, see notes 34-46
and accompanying text infra. Liberty and Forty-Eight, who also counterclaimed
for declaratory judgment, urged the exposure theory of liability. 451 F. Supp.
at 1233. For a discussion of the exposure theory of liability, see notes 47-52
and accompanying text infra.
12. 451 F. Supp. at 1239. District Judge Feikens initially noted that plain-
tiff INA, as well as Illinois National and Affiliated FM, had previously relied
on the exposure theory in deciding whether they were obligated to defend or
indemnify their insureds. Id. The court suggested that this implicit approval
of the exposure theory afforded the correct interpretation of the scope of cover-
age provided by the policy. Id. Judge Feikens also noted that the medical
evidence supported an application of the exposure theory in that each in-
halation of asbestos fiber results in tissue change and, therefore, "[e]ach minute
injury may then be a part of a 'continuing tort'....." Id., quoting Karjala
v. Johns-Manville, 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975). The court, after rejecting
INA's position that cases dealing with statutes of limitations, workmen's com-
pensation and construction of the word "occurrences" apply, concluded that
the obligation to defend and to indemnify would be apportioned on the basis
of the relative length of the insurers' coverage, and that Forty-Eight would be
responsible for part of any judgment rendered against it in proportion to the
period in which it was self-insured. 451 F. Supp. at 1244-45.
13. All parties appealed the district court's decision. 633 F.2d at 1217.
Appellants INA, Affiliated FM, Illinois National and Liberty Mutual, supported
by several amici curiae, challenged the district court's use of the exposure theory
of liability. Id. at 1217. For a discussion of the manifestation and exposure
theories of liability, see notes 33-52 and accompanying text infra. Appellee
Forty-Eight urged modification of the district court's opinion in three respects.
See 633 F.2d at 1220-21. For a discussion of Forty-Eight's three suggestions,
see notes 79-83 and accompanying text infra.
14. The case was heard by Senior Circuit Judge Peck and Judges Keith
and Merritt. Judge Keith wrote the majority opinion, and Judge Merritt wrote
a dissenting opinion.
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to defend and indemnify its insured. Insurance Company of North
America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cit. 1980).
Asbestos-caused lung diseases - asbestosis,15 mesothelioma 16 and
pulmonary carcinoma (lung cancer) 17 - are unlike many other occupa-
tional injuries since a long latency period exists between the time of
contact with asbestos and the apparent effect of the diseases.1 8 Asbes-
tosis, for example, may take as long as twenty years to manifest itself.10
15. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Asbestosis, the most common of
the three asbestos-related injuries, is characterized by lung scarring and is com-
monly found among workers whose work continually exposes them to asbestos
fibers. 493 F.2d at 1083. This disease was discussed by the Borel court:
The disease is difficult to diagnose in its early stages because there is a
long latent period between initial exposure and apparent effect. This
latent period may vary according to individual idiosyncrasy, duration
and intensity of exposure, and the type of asbestos used. In some
cases, the disease may manifest itself in less than ten years after initial
exposure. In general, however, it does not manifest itself until ten
to twenty-five or more years after initial exposure. This latent period
is explained by the fact that asbestos fibers, once inhaled, remain in
place in the lung, causing a tissue reaction that is slowly progressive
and apparently irreversible.
Id. For a full discussion of asbestos and its effects on industrial insulation
workers, see Selikoff, Churg, & Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among
Insulation Workers, 132 ANN. N.Y. AcAD. Sc. 139, passim (1965) [hereinafter
referred to as "Occurrence of Asbestosis']. See also Mansfield, supra note 4,
at 861-63, for an analysis of the pleural and parenchymal variations of asbestosis.
16. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Mesothelioma, which is a tumor
arising on the tissue surface of the lung, has a 25 to 40 year latency period and
has recently become a commonly alleged injury in the asbestos workers' cases.
See, e.g., Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 838 (E.D. Tex.
1980) (mesothelioma); Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 294
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (asbestosis, scarred lungs, lung cancer and mesothelioma);
Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods., Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Ky.
1979) (mesothelioma and lung cancer). For discussions of pleural and peritoneal
versions of mesothelioma, see Occurrence of Asbestosis, supra note 15, at 139.
See also Mansfield, supra note 4, at 863-64.
17. See Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 294 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (multi-party suits claiming scarred lungs, lung cancer and pulmonary or
broncheogenic carcinoma). Pulmonary carcinoma, or lung cancer, originates
in the upper portions of the lungs and is prevalent among those occupationally
exposed to cigarette smoke and other carcinogens. Occurrence of Asbestosis,
supra note 15, at 863. In addition, bronchogenic carcinoma can have origins
in concentrated inhalation of asbestos fibres. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of
N. America, No. 78-1011, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981).
18. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1082-84 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974). The Borel court discussed the
latency periods in asbestos-diseases and noted that the latent period is affected
by several variables, including the extent and duration of exposure, the in-
tensity of exposure, and individual idiosyncrasies such as smoking. Id. at 1083.
The court also noted that the effect of the disease is cumulative since each
exposure may result in additional tissue changes. Id. Thus, it was concluded
that the latency period will be determined by the various factors which con-
tribute to the overall effect. Id.
19. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). For a discussion of the latency
period for asbestosis and other asbestos-related diseases, see notes 15-18 supra.
10831980-81]
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The continuous exposure of workers to asbestos fibers over the
course of many years 20 has recently given rise to numerous lawsuits
seeking damages for asbestos-related injuries.2 ' Tort actions have been
brought by injured shipyard or insulation workers 22 after their injuries
are diagnosed or their symptoms are manifested.23 The workers' claim
that the defendant manufacturer or supplier of asbestos fibers or products
failed to warn them that asbestos was a dangerous product 24 and, there-
20. See, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 156(8th Cir. 1975) (exposure from 1948 until June 1966); Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974) (exposure from 1936 until 1969); Bassham v. Owens-Corning Fiber
Glass Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1007, 1007-08 (D.N.M. 1971) (exposure from 1948
until 1969).
Major studies have concluded that asbestos insulation workers with more
than 40 years experience exhibit a 90% higher incidence of abnormality than
those with less than 10 years experience. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974),
citing The Occurrence of Asbestosis, supra note 15. In addition, Joseph Cali-
fano, former Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
has estimated that 8 to 11 million American workers have been exposed to
asbestos since the beginning of the Second World War. See Mansfield, supra
note 4. at 866-67.
21. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081-82 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Numerous party-plaintiffs, suing
on their own behalf or on behalf of their decedents, have commenced actions
against their employers or other suppliers of asbestos fibers or products. See,
e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 156 (8th Cir. 1975)
(construction worker suit against manufacturer of asbestos insulation); Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081-82 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (industrial insulation worker's suit against manu-
facturer of insulation materials containing asbestos); Johnson v. Turner &
Newall, Ltd., Nos. 78-464, 78-1027, 78-1041, 78-1117, 78-1987, 78-2023, 78-3046 &
78-4172 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 1980) (plant workers suits against brokers and miner
suppliers of raw asbestos fibers to employers); Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Ky. 1979) (administrator's action
for personal injuries and wrongful death against decedent's former employer's
suppliers of asbestos products); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md.
70, 72, 394 A.2d 299, 300 (1978) (secretary's action against firm engaged in the
purchasing, fabrication, sale and installation of asbestos products against
employer).
22. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081-83
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The diseases can appear
alone or in combination with the other diseases. Compare Flatt v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 838 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 1980) (meso-
thelioina only) with Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 294
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 1980) (asbestosis, mesothelioma, scarred lungs, lung cancer
and other bone and tissue disorders).
23. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974).
24. 493 F.2d at 1088. In Borel, a former industrial insulation worker
alleged that insulation materials manufactured by the defendants were un-
reasonably dangerous because the defendants failed to give adequate warnings
of a known or knowable danger. Id. Judge Wisdom, writing for the court,
agreed, and held that a seller is under a duty to warn of those dangers that
are reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 1088-91. The court ruled, as a matter of
law, that the dangers in inhaling asbestos dust were not sufficiently obvious to,
the employee to relieve the defendants of their duty to issue warnings. Id.
1084
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fore, should be held liable under various theories of tort liability.25 In
several jurisdictions, manufacturers and suppliers are held jointly and
severally liable for the plaintiffs' asbestos-related injuries.26
The insurance coverage disputes between suppliers or manufacturers
of asbestos and their casualty insurers are separate from the underlying
products liability lawsuits.27 These declaratory judgment actions sound
In rejecting the "state of the art" defense, which may relieve manufacturers of
liability where scientific and technological knowledge is such that a product
could not be made safer without impairing its usefulness, the court reasoned:
As a practical matter, the decision to market such a product requires
a balancing of the product's utility against its known or foreseeable
danger. But, as comment k [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS] makes
clear, even when such balancing leads to the conclusion that marketing
is justified, the seller still has a responsibility to inform the user or
consumer of the risk of harm. The failure to give adequate warnings
in these circumstances renders the product unreasonably dangerous.
Id. at 1088-89 (citations omitted).
For a discussion of the duty to warn under strict liability, see generally
Comment, The Failure to Warn Defect After Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.:
Preservation of the Limited Duty and Demise of the Knowledge Requirement
Defense, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 309 (1980).
25. See Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th
Cir. 1975); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1092-96 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974).
The theory of recovery most often utilized by plaintiffs is strict liability
in tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964). Compare Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087-94 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974) (industrial insulation worker allowed to recover
under a strict products liability theory) with Bassham v. Owens-Corning Fiber
Glass Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1007, 1007-09 (D.N.M. 1971) (insulation worker's al-
leged contraction of asbestosis not actionable on a strict liability theory).
26. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094-96 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974). For a discussion of joint and
several liability, concert-of-action theory and enterprise or industry-wide lia-
bility, see generally Sindell v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1980) (DES litigation); Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enter-
prise Liability, 46 FORDHiAM L. REV. 963 (1978); Comment, Emerging Theories
of Proof in Products Liability: Resolving the Problem of Identifying DES
Manufacturers, 26 Vill. L. Rev. 997 (1981).
27. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011, slip op.
at 1-2 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981); Porter v. American Optical Corp., No. 75-2202,
slip op. at 6-8 (E.D. La. November 23, 1977) afl'd in part & rev'd in part, 641
F.2d 1128 (5th Cir, 1981). See also Note, Insurance Law - Products Liability
- Time of Exposure Triggers Coverage for Asbestos-Related Diseases, 26
WAYNE L. REV. 1127 (1980). It has been noted by commentators that over
5,000 personal injury products liability suits have been commenced against past
and present manufacturers, distributors, mining companies and other suppliers
of asbestos fibers and products. See Mansfield, supra note 4, at 865. See also
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1086 & n.17 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974). Various insurance companies have
issued primary or excess policies of insurance to the numerous party-defendants
named in the underlying products liability suits. See generally, Mansfield,
supra, at 876-78. Declaratory judgments involving insurance coverage issues
have also been issued in the diethylstilbestrol (DES) lawsuits. See generally
Emons Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp.
1011 (E.D. La. 1979). See also Elliot, The New Comprehensive General Lia-
6
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in contract and focus on interpretation of the language used in the
standard CGL insurance policies.2 8 Under CGL policies, the insurer
agrees to indemnify its insured for all sums which the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" caused by
an "occurrence" arising during the policy period.29 The interpretation
of this language as it relates to asbestos caused diseases remains unclear
since courts must decide when "bodily injury occurs" in ailments char-
acterized by long latency periods.80
Because of the time lag between when one comes in contact with
asbestos fibers and when an asbestos cause disease manifests itself, dis-
agreement as to which of two or more consecutive insurers are respon-
sible to defend a claim has arisen.81 Two theories of construction of the
language used in the CGL policies of insurance 32 have emerged and in-
surance coverage regarding the underlying asbestos-related lawsuit at-
taches at one of two distinct times depending on which of the theories
is accepted. 88
Under the first theory, the "manifestation theory," bodily injury is
not deemed to have occurred until the date the disease manifests itself.8 4
bility Policy, 12-3 to 12-5 PRACTICING LAW INST., LiAB. DISPUTES (Sol. Screiber
ed. 1968).
28. See Mansfield, supra note 4, at 875. See also Comment, Liability In-
surance for Insidious Diseases: Who Picks up the Tabs, 48 FORDHAM L. REv.
657 (1980).
29. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011, slip op.
at 3 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981). See also notes 30-55 and accompanying text infra.
30. Compare Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011,
slip op. at 3-5 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981) (each exposure to asbestos triggers cover-
age) with Porter v. American Optical Corp., No. 75-2202, slip op. at 5-8 (E.D.
La. November 23, 1977), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.
1981) (manifestation of disease triggers coverage). See also Mansfield, supra
note 4, at 874-79.
31. For excerpts from typical CGL insurance policies, see note 5 supra.
Generally, the coverage issues are presented by way of declaratory judgment
proceedings. See generally Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, No.
78-1011, slip op. at I (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981); Porter v. American Optical Corp.,
No. 75-2202 (E.D. La. November 23 ,1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd in part
&- rev'd in part, 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arm-
strong Cork Co., No. 80-429-G (D. Mass. 1980); Crown Cork &c Seal, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. &c Sur. Co., Sept. Term 1978, No. 1292, slip op. at 1 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. Oct. 9, 1980).
32. For an analysis of the manifestation and exposure theories of liability,
see notes 33-52 and accompanying text supra.
33. See Porter v. American Optical Corp., No. 75-2202 (E.D. La. Nov. 23,
1977), aff'd in part &- rev'd in part, 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981); American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. E. R. Squibb, 95 Misc. 2d 222, 226, 406 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660
(Sup. Ct. 1978).
34. See Mansfield, supra note 4, at 876; Note, supra note 27, at 1128. For
cases which apply a manifestation theory of liability in various contexts, see
generally General Dynamics Corp. v. Benefits Rev. Bd., 565 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.
1977) (workmens' compensation case); Tijsseling v. General Fire Sc Life Assur.
Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 623, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976) (insurance liability does
not begin until a latent defect manifests itself in property case); Remmer v.
1086 [VOL. 26: p. 1080-,
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Accordingly, those carriers on risk on the date of manifestation must
provide a defense and indemnity payments for any judgment of liability
in the underlying asbestos suit.8 5 Variations of this theory have been
adopted in statute of limitations cases, 6 workmens' compensation cases, 7
and health insurance cases. 8
The only reported case advocating the manifestation theory of lia-
bility in an asbestos injury insurance case was Porter v. American Optical
Corp. decided by the Eastern District of Louisiana. 39 However, this
case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings by the Fifth
Circuit.40 In Porter, an insulation worker successfully sued a manu-
Glens Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d 19 (1956) (manifestation
date of a latent defect triggers coverage in property case). See also Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949); Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534
F.2d 566, 570, 574-5 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Karjala
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th Cir. 1975) (statute of
limitations begins to run only when an employee's injury manifests itself).
35. See notes 16-26 and accompanying text supra.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123-25 (1979); Urie v.
Thompson, 377 U.S. 163, 170 (1949); Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534
F.2d 566, 570, 574-75 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). These
cases hold that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows
or should know that he was injured. See Urie v. Thompson, 377 U.S. 163, 170(1949). But see Thorton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002,
417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d
212, 217, 188 N.E.2d 142, 144, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716-17, amended mere., 12
N.Y.2d 1073, 190 N.E.2d 253, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808(1963) (statute of limitations in a latent injury case begins to run from time of
injury, even if undiscovered). See also note 71 infra.
37. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Benefits Rev. Bd., 565 F.2d 208
(2d Cir. 1977); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137, cert. denied, 350
U.S. 913 (1955); Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 570 (1939); Bucuk v. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. Super. 187,
139 A.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1958). These cases suggest that either the
employer under whom the worker was last exposed to asbestos, or the worker's
present employer, pays. See Traveler Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d at 145.
The rule is not a pure manifestation approach but represents a compromise in
assessing coverage for progressive diseases based on the premise of the efficient
administration of claims. Id. See also note 72 infra.
38. See, e.g., Kissil v. Beneficial Nat. Life Ins. Co., 64 N.J. 555, 319 A.2d
67 (1974); Royal Family Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 42 Ala. App. 481, 168 So. 2d 262(Civ. App. 1964); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v, Reynolds, 48 Ariz. 205, 60 P.2d
1070 (1936); Cohen v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 150 Minn. 507, 185 N.W.
939 (1921). These cases are predicated on the theory that latent conditions do
not trigger indemnification liability where the plaintiff does not know or can
not discover with reasonable certainty the condition. Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d
686, 688-89 (1957) (no disease unless it can be diagnosed with reasonable medi-
cal certainty). For a discussion of various health insurance cases and application
of the manifestation theory of liability, see Note supra note 27, at 1127-32.
See also note 74, infra.
39. No. 75-2202 (E.D. La. Nov. 23, 1977), aff'd in part & rev'd in part,
641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981).
40. 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit stated that it
was content with the Sixth Circuit's approach to this issue and incorporated by
reference the reasoning and result of the Insurance Co. of N. America v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc. opinion. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d
10871980-81]
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facturer of a respirator for injuries sustained during the course of his
employment,4 1 contending that the respirator was defectively designed.42
The district court discussed American Optical's insurance coverage 43
and concluded that the insurer on risk at the time of the manifestation
of the plaintiff's illness was liable.44 The court reasoned that while the
worker was exposed to the injurious material during the earlier carrier's
period of coverage, "his continued exposure during this period did not
result in any manifestation of injury, i.e., sickness or disease . .",
within the terms of the insurance contract. 45 The Fifth Circuit, in re-
versing the district court, stated that the "injurious exposure" theory was
the "proper" theory of insurance coverage in asbestos cases. 4"
1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981). The court remanded for a determination of pro-
ration of coverage between the casualty insurers. Id.
41. Porter v. American Optical Corp., No. 75-2202, slip op. at 5a (E.D. La.
Nov. 23, 1977). The plaintiff brought suit for injuries sustained while he
was an employee of National Gypsum Company in New Orleans. 641 F.2d at
1131. Porter worked approximately thirty years in National Gypsum's main
plan where high concentrations of dust and airborne fiber required use of
respirators. Id. at 1133. Porter used American Optical Corporation's (American
Optical) respirator and filter apparatus on the job but was debilitated by
asbestosis in 1974. Id. at 1131-33.
42. No. 75-2202, slip op. at 5 (E.D. La. Nov. 23, 1977). The plaintiff
had sued under a strict liability theory, alleging that his injuries were proxi-
mately caused by the respirator manufacturers' failure to warn him of the
dangers involved in the use of the respirator, as well as by the defects in the
respirator's design. Id.
43. Id. American Optical joined, as third-party defendants, three insurance
companies which had insured American Optical during Porter's employment
with National Gypsum and during the time Porter was ill. 641 F.2d at 1131.
From 1954 until January 1, 1971, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (Aetna)
provided coverage. Id. at 1142. From January 1, 1971 until January 1, 1975,
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company (Hartford) provided coverage in two
separate policies covering American Optical, as a corporate affiliate of Warner-
Lambert Company. id. at 1142-43. From January 1, 1975 until January 1,
1978, Continental Insurance Company (Continental) extended coverage to
American Optical. Id. at 1143.
44. See Porter v. American Optical Corp., No. 75-2202 slip op. at 5 (E.D.
La. Nov. 23, 1977). The court thus exempted both the carrier on risk during
the longest period of the plaintiffs exposure, and the carrier on risk when
positive diagnosis of the illness was made. Id.
45. Id. Thus, the insurer on the risk at the time of the exposure was ex-
cused from liability primarily as a matter of contract construction since the
policy precisely defined bodily injury as "sickness or illness" only. See id. Cf.
notes 6 & 27 supra ('sbodily injury" not limited to "sickness or illness" only,
but includes "bodily injury" itself). The district court reasoned that the Aetna
policy (1954-1971) did not provide coverage because exposure to the asbestos
during its coverage did not result in a manifestation of "sickness or disease".
No. 75-2202, slip op. at 5 (E.D. La. Nov. 23, 1977). Thus, no occurrence of
bodily injury existed during this time period. Id. Further, Continental was
absolved of liability since Porter's exposure to asbestos and manifestation of his
illness occurred prior to the dates it was on risk (1975-1978). See 641 F.2d at
1143-44.
46. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981).
See note 40 supra.
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Under the second theory of liability, the "exposure theory", bodily
injury is held to occur upon the first inhalation of asbestos fiber.47 This
theory relies heavily upon medical evidence which shows that asbestos-
,caused diseases involve minute cumulative, and progressive injuries to
the body.4 8 The essence of the exposure theory of liability, which has
been supported by the various manufacturers and suppliers,4 9 is to spread
losses over the years of primary coverage so that one carrier does not bear
the total burden of indemnification and defense of the manufacturer or
supplier. 50
Several advocates of the exposure theory contend that only those
carriers on risk during the years when the worker is exposed to asbestos
should be under a joint and several duty to defend and indemnify the
insured.5' Other exposure theorists, on the other hand, suggest that all
47. For cases applying an exposure theory of liability in various contexts,
see generally Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011, slip op.
at 5-6 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981) (exposure rule ado pted in coverage action con-
cerning asbestos disease litigation); Sybla v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
54 Cal. App. 3d 895, 127 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1976) (latent defect in property which
later causes damage triggers insurance coverage); Schwartz v. Heyden Newport
Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, amended mem.,
12 N.Y.2d 1073, 190 N.E.2d 253, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808
(1963) (statute of limitations begins to run with commission of wrongful act).
See also Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981)
(reversing lower court's application of manifestation theory and adopting, by
reference, the Sixth Circuit's analysis in asbestos insurance coverage cases).
48. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011, slip op.
at 3-5 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981). See also Mansfield, supra note 4, at 876-77.
The uncontroverted medical testimony reveals that bodily injury occurs with
the first inhalation of asbestos fibers which reach the anterior cells of the lungs.
Id. The fibers remain there and cause continuous, progressive and insidious
harm to the lungs. Id. See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1083-86 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
49. See Mansfield, supra note 4, at 876. The exposure theory of liability
is advocated by all the party-defendants in the underlying lawsuits, except
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. Id. Also, several insurance companies, including
Travelers, Hartford and a minority of the Lloyd's of London syndicates of
underwriters support the exposure theory. Id. The other insurance carriers,
including Liberty Mutual, Aetna, INA and the majority of the Lloyd's of
London excess market support the manifestation theory of liability. Id.
50. Id. at 877. It has been noted that under the exposure theory manu-
facturers will not be forced to pay increased liability insurance costs in order
to cover present manifestations of disease in workers since no one insurer will
have to bear the entire loss. Id. Cf. note 34 supra (contrary result under
manifestation theory). Additionally, recent excess carriers will not have to
provide indemnification under an exposure theory of liability since the primary
limits of the basic carriers will not be reached as rapidly as under the mani-
festation theory. Mansfield, supra note 4, at 877.
51. See Mansfield, supra note 4, at 876. This view can be illustrated as
follows: "[I]f an underlying claimant were exposed to asbestos products in a
shipyard during World War II (i.e., 1942-1946), then the insurer which pro-
vided coverage for those years would bear the entire burden for the lawsuit
even if diagnosis were in 1975 and the suit filed in 1976." id.
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carriers on risk subsequent to the initial exposure are jointly and
severally responsible for defense and indemnification because the various
asbestos diseases are continuous and progressive.5 2
Advocates of both the manifestation and exposure theories of lia-
bility are conscious of the need to arrive at an administratively manage-
able construction of the CGL insurance policies. 53 In interpreting these
policies, courts prefer to spread losses throughout the industry in a
manner that results in fairness to the parties concerned. 54 Accordingly,
the manifestation theory of liability has been rejected in favor of the
exposure theory.5 5 However, rules of construction that would place the
burden of liability on insurers to minimize possible tort liability for
hazardous activities have been urged by various commentators, and
52. Id. at 876-77. This variation of the exposure theory can be illustrated
as follows:
If an underlying plaintiff were exposed to asebstos products in the
1942-1946 period, were diagnosed in 1975, and filed a lawsuit in 1976,
certain exposure advocates would argue that all insurance carriers who
had issued policies from 1942 to 1976 would be obligated to provide a
defense and indemnity to the manufacturer.
Id. at 877. This branch of the exposure theory is premised on the fact that
asbestos fibers remain in the anterior portions of the lung, and cause continuous
harm to the lungs. Id. at 876-87. Thus, all carriers are liable for indemnifica-
tion if they provided insurance during any period a plaintiff was employed,
irrespective of the date that the coverage terminated or that the disease was
diagnosed. Id.
53. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011, at 6-7
(D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981). Such administratively manageable interpretations of
insurance policies are aimed at avoiding litigation. See Mansfield, supra note
4, at 877. However, commentators have noted that any attempt to forecast
the ultimate resolutions of these insurance coverage questions may prove to be
speculative and indeterminate. Id. The variables that will affect judicial
solution of these issues include uncertainties relating to third-party recoveries
from exposure due to ripout or repair work, unpredictable legislative response,
and the number of future lawsuits. See id. Cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo,
225 F.2d 137, 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913 (1955) (efficient admin-
istration in workmens' compensation cases is of overriding importance).
54. See, e.g., Champion Int'l Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 546 F.2d 502
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977) (coverage extended beyond
terms of policy where personal or property damages arise out of continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974) (manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products held jointly
and severally liable for a worker's injuries due to exposure to the products);
Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 399 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Pa. 1975
(insurance coverage begins at exposure date where latent defects slowly accumu-
late in property damage situations); Hall v. E.J. DuPont de Nemours k Co.,
Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (industry-wide liability imposed on
manufacturers of blasting caps which injured plaintiffs).
55. See, e.g., Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.
1981) (rejecting manifestation and adopting exposure theory); Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981) (applying
exposure rules and discounting manifestation theory).
1090 [VOL. 26: p. 108G
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favored by some courts.56 This allegedly could cause carriers of insureds
who engage in relatively dangerous activities to encourage the insured
to make such activities safer in order to avoid the high resultant costs
of indemnification. 57
In the instant decision, the Sixth Circuit prefaced its opinion with
a background of the asbestos disease litigation,58 and stated that "there
is a need for us to arrive at an administratively manageable interpreta-
tion of the insurance policies, one that can be applied with minimal
need for litigation".5 9 Judge Keith, writing for the majority, noted that
cumulative diseases are different from ordinary tort situations 60 by re-
ferring to the medical testimony presented at trial.61 The court then
noted that a consistent interpretation of "bodily injury", "occurrence",
and "disease" as a matter of contract law was needed.62 The court ac-
56. See G. CALABRESI: THE COSTS OF ACcDENTS 68-93 (1970). Calabresi
discusses a "cheapest cost avoider" theory which is a pure market approach to
accident cost avoidance. See id. Calabresi suggests that accidents could be
avoided entirely, or their frequency substantially reduced, if costs of accidents
were assessed to those actors who, and those activities which, could avoid the
accident and its accompanying costs most cheaply. Id. at 135. Although several
criteria which can be used to choose the cheapest cost avoider are noted by
Calabresi, the most significant guideline is that accident costs should be allo-
cated in such a way as to maximize the likelihood that errors will be corrected
by the market. Id. at 150. Also, a forum and method are to be chosen by
the various actors which are best suited to follow this guideline and thus de-
termine which party can most cheaply modify its behavior so as to avoid acci-
dents. Id. at 160-64.
57. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 55, at 135-73.
58. 633 F.2d at 1214-15. The court noted that asbestosis is the most com-
mon disease, and stated that its opinion would discuss the liability situation
only as it relates to asbestosis. See id. at 1214 n.l.
59. Id. at 1218. For the court's decision regarding the medical determina-
tion of the point which asbestosis occurs, see note 69 infra.
60. 633 F.2d at 1218-19. The court relied on medical testimony to buttress
this determination. Id. at 1218. See also notes 65-75 and accompanying text
infra for the court's three bases for rejecting the manifestation theory of lia-
bility and accepting the notion that cumulative diseases are different from
ordinary tort situations.
61. 633 F.2d at 1218-19. The court noted that due to the nature of asbestos
related injuries, numerous opinions as to the point in time when an afflicted
party has been "injured" or "diseased" have been offered. Id. The Sixth
Circuit's reference to medical evidence resulted in the determination that the
definition of "disease" is a judgment call. Id. at 1218. The court considered
Dr. George Wright's testimony which contrasted a physician's interpretation of
"disease" with that of an histologist. Id. Dr. Wright testified that a physician
or biologist would not regard asbestosis as a disease unless it was manifested
by symptoms or diagnosis. Id. Conversely, a histologist would consider asbes-
tosis as a disease from the very beginning since tissue damage occurs once the
asbestos fibers enter the tissue systems. Id.
62. Id. at 1219. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text infra for the court's
analysis of when the disease, as a matter of contract law, is deemed to occur.
For a review of these words insofar as they relate to CGL policies of insurance,
see notes 6 &c 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
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knowledged the two theories of construction which could be applied to
determine coverage 63 and rejected the manifestation theory of liability
on three grounds.6 4
The court initially posited that "the legal theory used in the under-
lying tort suits is certainly relevant in helping a court define what was
meant by the policy language." 65 The court thus reasoned that since
the underlying theory of tort liability is that the asbestos manufacturer
or supplier of asbestos products continually failed to warn asbestos
workers of the dangers of breathing asbestos particles, the contracting
parties would presume that their coverage would parallel this theory of
liability.68 The court noted that without this assumption, the insurer's
purported coverage would be "illusory" and a manufacturer would not
be able to secure insurance coverage in later years once the disease had
begun to manifest itself.6 7 Moreover, the court inferred that subsequent
insurers can impose high deductibles on their insureds which can effec-
tively leave the insured with no coverage.68
The second ground set forth by the court for rejecting the mani-
festation theory was the universal acceptance that the time when asbes-
tosis manifests itself is not the time when disease occurs. e9 The court
63. 633 F.2d at 1217-18. The court suggested that the manifestation theory,
which was urged by INA, Affiliated FM, Illinois National, Liberty Mutual and
several amici curiae, and the exposure theory, proposed by Forty-Eight,
Travelers, several amici curiae, and supported by the district court, represented
the two principal coverage theories. See id. For an analysis of these theories,
.see notes 33-50 and accompanying text supra.
64. 633 F.2d at 1219-20. See also, notes 66-71 and accompanying text infra.
65. 633 F.2d at 1219. The court rejected INA's attempt to refute the
district court's reliance on Borel as controlling precedent. Id. For a discussion
of the Borel opinion, see notes 15, 18 & 23 supra. INA argued that rules of
contract construction, not rules of tort law, should control interpretation of
insurance policies. 633 F.2d at 1219. However, the court reasoned that INA
was oversimplifying the issue, and stated that insurance policies must be con-
strued to protect a manufacturer-insured from product liability judgments.
Id. See also note 67 infra.
66. 633 F.2d at 1219.
67. Id. In its discussion of illusory coverage, the court reviewed INA's
claim that the district court's reliance upon Borel as "controlling precedent for
interpretation of insurance contracts is almost embarrassing." Id. at 1219 n.12.
The court rejected INA's contention and stated that CGL insurance contracts
necessarily follow tort theories so that it can be readily determined what the
policy meant to cover. See id. See also note 65 supra.
68. 633 F.2d at 1215 n.6. The court noted that Forty-Eight's present car-
rier was Liberty Mutual. Id. at 1215-16 n.6 & 1218-19. The parties' contract of
insurance provided a $100,000.00 per person deductible for asbestosis cases,
which, the court noted, as a practical matter, left Forty-Eight uninsured because
most asbestosis cases settle for less than $100,000.00. Id.
69. Id. at 1219. The majority agreed that it is possible to hold a hearing
to determine the point at which asbestos in the lungs results in the body's
1092 [VOL. 26: p. 1080
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considered medical evidence produced at trial to support this position. 7o
Finally, the court noted that the law favors a construction of insurance
contracts in favor of the insured and against the insurer.71
The Sixth Circuit also determined that analogous insurance cases
urged by the appellants, such as the statute of limitations cases,7 2 work-
defenses being overwhelmed, and asbestosis could thus be said to have occurred
and the manufacturer would be treated as on the risk from that time. Id.
Judge Keith rejected the dissent's suggestion of looking to x-ray diagnosis
and establishing a 10 year point on the ground that medical testimony indi-
cates that "bodily injury" occurs at or after inhalation. Id. at 1217 n.10. The
majority, however, was pragmatic:
The only problem with this Solomonian interpretation is that no one
wants it. The principle reason is cost. If medical testimony as to
asbestosis' origin would have to be taken in each of the thousands of
asbestosis cases, the cost of litigation would be prohibitive. This ap-
pears to be especially true since many of the asbestosis cases are settled
before trial. In addition, it is almost impossible for a doctor to look
back and testify with any precision as to when the development of
asbestosis "crossed the line" and became a disease.
Id. at 1218.
70. Id. at 1219. The court referred to Dr. George Wright, a medical ex-
pert, who testified that an individual could delay seeing a doctor until a disease
is advanced to its furtherest stages, and the date of diagnosis would not then be
the date the disease began. See id.
71. Id. at 1219-20. The court of appeals adopted the district court's analy-
sis of this issue. Id. The district court, which determined that application of
either New Jersey or Illinois law would produce a similar result, stated that
"where the terms of insurance contracts are clear and unambiguous, they must
be given their common and ordinary meaning." 451 F. Supp. at 1237. (cita-
tions omitted). The corollary to this proposition is that a policy is to be
construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured where there is uncer-
tainty or ambguity over the interpretation of the policy. Id. (citations
omitted).
72. 633 F.2d at 1220. The court initially discussed cases determining when
the statute of limitations should start to run. Id. It was pointed out that in
latent injury cases, "the afflicted employee can be held to be 'injured' only
when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves".
Id., quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949) (citations omitted).
The reason underlying this "manifestation rule" is to protect plaintiffs, unaware
that they were being injured until years later when the disease manifests itself,
from having their claims barred by the statute of limitations. 633 F.2d at
1220. The court noted that these policy considerations are strong and would
prevent the harsh consequences of invoking the statute of limitations in typical
tort cases. Id. at 1220 & n.13. It was determined that application of these
decisions to the instant case would be anomalous since the policy considerations
are inapposite; that is, a manifestation rule could deny insurance coverage to
the insured since its excess or primary carrier would no longer be on risk. Id.
at 1220. Further, the court posited that "it is the injury and not its discovery
that makes the manufacturer liable in the underlying tort suit". Id. Finally,
the court said that despite the use of identical language in statutes of limita-
tions and insurance policies, the policy is to protect either the injured plaintiff
or insured, and not to bar recovery. Id. For cases discussing the statutes of
limitations issue, see id. at 1220 n.13 & 14 and cases cited therein. See also
note 36 supra.
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mens' compensation cases, 73 and health insurance cases, 74 present policy
considerations which are inapposite to the instant coverage issue. 75
Judge Keith rejected INA's argument that "bodily injury" meant "com-
pensable bodily injury", reasoning that the exposure theory adopted by
the district court was the superior interpretation for the contracts of
insurance 76 because it represented the intention of the parties 77 as well
as being a literal construction which would maximize the insured's
coverage3 8
73. 633 F.2d at 1221. The Sixth Circuit discussed Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913 (1955) in its analysis.
633 F.2d at 1221. Judge Keith noted that a "last employer pays" rule has been
adopted in cases such as Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo where an employee is
debilitated by a progressive and cumulative disease. See id. & n.15. However,
this rule was rejected because the policy considerations on which it is based
were held insufficient to override the rule of contract interpretation. Id.
Further, the importance of efficient administration of claims was held to be of
greater significance in the workmen's compensation suits than in liability in-
surance cases, and thus this policy consideration was held inapplicable. Id.
See also note 37 supra.
74. 633 F.2d at 1221. The Sixth Circuit discussed two cases, Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 48 Ariz. 205, 60 P.2d 1070 (1976) and Cohen v. North
Am. Life & Cas. Co., 150 Minn. 507, 185 N.W. 939 (1921) both of which adopted
the manifestation rule. 633 F.2d at 1212, 1221. See also id. n.17 and cases
cited therein. These cases were cited approvingly for the principle that insur-
ance policies must be strictly construed in favor of the insured. Id. at 1221.
It was noted that each case allowed protection for the insured, who was
disabled by sickness, because it would be "unfair to the insured and contrary
to his expectations when he bought the insurance to allow a hidden condition
to defeat the coverage which he bought". Id. (footnote omitted). Accordingly,
the Forty-Eight court adopted the exposure rule to afford coverage to the in-
sured under the policies of insurance construed in the insured's favor. Id.
See also note 38 supra.
75. 633 F.2d at 1222-23. The court rejected the appellants' argument,
stating:
The manufacturer here paid for protection from bodily injury result-
ing in liability. It should make no difference when the bodily injury
happens to become compensable. Put another way, we see nothing in
the policy which requires that the underlying plaintiffs' cause of action
accrue within the policy period. There exists a clear distinction be-
tween when bodily injury occurs and when the bodily injury which
has occurred becomes compensable.
Id. at 1223 (emphasis supplied by the court). However, the court intimated
that the insurance industry could foresee the use of an exposure rule. Id. n.19.
The policies themselves, as well as commentator interpretations of standard
CGL clauses, reflect industry-wide recognition that courts could apply a pro-
ration scheme or similar exposure theory. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 1223. The court suggested that "bodily injury" should be con-
strued to include tissue damage which occurs upon the initial inhalation of
asbestos fibers. Id. This construction would afford both a literal application
of policy language as well as construction which affords maximum coverage to
the insured. Id.
78. Id. This literal construction, it was noted, best represented what the
contracting parties intended. Id.
1094 [VOL. 26: p. 1080
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In conclusion, the court modified the determinations of the district
.court which had been challenged by the manufacturer. 7' First, the court
stated that Forty-Eight must pay for its share of the defense for the years
it was either self-insured or uninsured when the defense costs could be
readily apportioned.8 0 The court next accepted the fundamental tort
principle that liability for asbestos-caused injuries will not be adjudged
until it is shown that Forty-Eight's products were involved,8' while the
burden of disclaiming coverage is on the insurer.82 Finally, the Sixth
Circuit stated that the district court's proration formula did not produce
,an unjust result, and therefore rejected Forty-Eight's formula.' 3
79. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text infra.
80. 633 F.2d at 1224-25. Forty-Eight did not dispute that it had to bear its
;share of the liability for the years it was uninsured, but it argued that as long
,as any carrier had a duty to defend, Forty-Eight should not be liable for the
costs of defense. See id. Forty-Eight based this argument on the notion that
an insurer's duty to defend is much broader than its obligation to indemnify.
See id. at 1224, citing Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d
24 (1976).
Although the court agreed with these principles, it noted that an insurer
-must bear the entire costs of defending its insured only when "there is no
reasonable means of prorating the costs of defense between the covered and
non-covered items." 633 F.2d at 1224, quoting National Steel Constr. Co. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 14 Wash. App. 573, 576, 543 P.2d 642, 644 (1975).
The court then utilized Forty-Eight's "exposure theory" for prorating de-
fense costs. 633 F.2d at 1225. For a discussion of an insurer's duty to defend,
.see Note, An Insurer's Duty to Defend its Insured and an Insurer's Liability
for Wrongfully Declining to Defend its Insured, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 473,
473-490 (1980).
81. 633 F.2d at 1225. The court noted that while Forty-Eight would be
.held jointly and severally liable along with other asbestos manufacturers in an
underlying product liability suit, the insurer's liability determined in a declara-
tory judgment proceeding is individual and proportionate. Id. Thus, if an
.insurer can show no exposure took place during the years it was on risk, no
.liability exists on the part of the insurance company for indemnity or defense
because no bodily injury occurred within the policy's provisions. Id.
82. Id. n.27. This shifting of the burden of proof from the insured to
insurer was premised on the uniqueness of the asbestos disease litigation. Id.
Thus, each insurer is presumptively viewed as being on risk for the years the
worker was exposed, and the insurance company must show that certain of the
-manufacturer's products were not used. Id.
83. Id. at 1226. Forty-Eight's recommended formula and that of the district
-court can be contrasted as follows:
[11f three insurance companies were on the risk for a 9 year period of
exposure . . . the first insurer would be on the risk for the first 3
years plus the remaining 6 while the disease progressed. The second
insurer would be on the risk for 3 years plus the following 3 years.
The final insurer would be on the risk only for the final 3 years.
Thus, liability would be apportioned 9/18 for the first insurer, 6/18
for the second, and 3/18 for the third. Under the district court's
formula, . . . each insurer would be liable for 1/3 of the costs.
Id. (emphasis supplied by the court). The court rejected Forty-Eight's ap-
proach because of the policy's language which defined "occurrence' 'as "an
, accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions". Id. (em-
10951980-81]
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In his dissent, Judge Merritt argued that asbestosis is a disease which
progresses through an exposure stage, a discoverability stage, and a
manifestation stage.84 The dissent contended that the exposure theory
is at odds with insurance law, since liability is ordinarily not imposed
until an identifiable harm arises,8 5 and contrary to insurance cases which
conclude that "latent conditions that are not discoverable with a reason-
able certainty do not amount to an event or condition that triggers in-
demnification liability." 86 The manifestation theory of liability, how-
ever, was also rejected based on grounds of fairness 87 and considerations
of insurance and tort law.88
The dissent concluded that in light of medical evidence and case
law developments a carrier's coverage should begin with the discover-
phasis supplied by the court). Also, the court determined that the extent of an
insurers liability should not turn on the fortuity of which insurer provided
coverage when an injury manifests itself. Id.
84. See id. at 1229 (Merritt, J., dissenting). See notes 85-88 and accompany-
ing text infra for a discussion of Judge Merritt's three stages.
85. 633 F.2d at 1229-30 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The basis of the dissent's
criticism of the exposure rule was that some asbestos may be inhaled without
the disease ever developing, and therefore liability should not attach. Id. at
1229 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
86. Id. The dissent cited the following property insurance and health in-
surance cases in support of its position: Broccolo v. Horace Mann Mut. Cas.
Co., 37 Il. App. 2d 493, 186 N.E.2d 89 (1962) (hysterectomy performed upon
insured within two years of date that insured came within group policy fell
within exclusionary clause as sickness was contracted prior to coverage in view
of treatment for bleeding prior to coverage date, although disability occurred
after that date); Craig v. Central Nat'l Life Insurance Co., 16 Il1. App. 344, 148
N.E.2d 31 (1958) (under health insurance policy excepting pregnancy or sick-
ness from coverage unless same occurred at least nine months after issuance of
policy, insured entitled to recover where sickness occurred less than nine months
after policy date); Kissel v. Beneficial Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 64 N.J. 555, 319 A.2d
67 (1974) (words "contracted and commencing" meant that coverage would exist
where first positive symptoms of disease did not manifest themselves until after
first 15 days of child's life). 633 F.2d at 1229 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The
dissent posited that those cases stand for the proposition that indemnification
liability is not triggered where latent conditions are not discoverable with a
reasonable certainty. Id. at 1229-30 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
87. 653 F.2d at 1230 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The manifestation rule was
discounted on grounds similar to those advanced by the majority; specifically,
that the rule would most likely result in no coverage at all to the insured. Id.
Judge Merritt suggested that a domino effect would result with carriers refusing
to insure such manufacturers, or imposing an extraordinarily high deductible
for asbestos disease lawsuits. Id. See note 68 supra.
88. Id. at 1230 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the mani-
festation rule would construe the words "disease" and "occurrence" more favor-
ably to the insurer than to the insured; and intimated that such rules of con-
struction are contrary to insurance law principles. Id. For further support of
this proposition, see note 67 supra. In addition, the dissent posited that various
tort law cases hold that a disease may exist if it can be diagnosed with reasonable
medical certainty, but that this diagnosis is not required to determine the be-
ginning date for coverage. 633 F.2d at 1230 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
1096 [VOL. 26: p. 1080,
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ability stage.8 9 Judge Merritt suggested that an arbitrary "ten years
from the date of first exposure" rule should be adopted as the time that
:the disease of asbestosis occurs so as to comport with the medical
.,testimony.9o
It is submitted that the Sixth Circuit's goal of establishing a single
-rule to apply to the insurance coverage suits between the party defend-
ants in asbestos disease lawsuit and their casualty insurers is laudable.91
The court properly presented the two major theories of construction of
CGLs 92 and correctly applied the exposure theory to the facts of the case
before it.9
Further, it is suggested that the majority correctly noted that if a
manifestation theory was applied in this type of case, few insurers would
contract to protect a company which had exposed thousands of workers
to a hazard for an earlier period of years.9 4 Having exposed workers to
asbestos, the probability that thousands of asbestos caused injuries will
manifest themselves at a future date is great.9 5 Thus, the application of
a manifestation theory would result in carriers limiting their coverage,
increasing the policy deductible and offering coverage at exorbitant
premiums.6
However, it is suggested that the court's shifting of the burden of
.disclaiming coverage to the insured was not properly supported.97 The
.court determined that it was "appropriate to presumptively view each
89. 653 F.2d at 1230-31 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that
,asbestosis is a "latent" disease and is susceptible of discoverability through
:medical detection devices. Id. at 1230 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1231 (Merritt, J., dissenting). Judge Merritt conceded that
problems of judicial and administrative manageability would flow from the
adoption of this rule. Id. He noted that this rule is predicated on the injured
party's having had "heavy exposure" to asbestos dust. Id. However, he referred
to Dr. Wright's medical testimony which indicated that 10 years is an approxi-
mation of the time frame in which asbestosis would occur. Id.
91. Id. at 1218. See also notes 40-54 and accompanying text supra. It is
.suggested that the need for administratively manageable interpretations of
policies is paramount, as was noted by both the majority and the dissent. See
'id. at 1218-19, 1230-31 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
92. 633 F.2d at 1217. For a review of the court's analysis of these theories
.and the reasoning supporting its holding to adopt the exposure rule, see notes
.59-76 and accompanying text supra.
93. 633 F.2d at 1218-23. See also notes 45-48 and accompanying text infra.
94. See 633 F.2d at 1222-23. See notes 68 & 69 and accompanying text
.supra.
95. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011, slip op. at 6(D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981). See also Peters, Asbestos Products Liability, 4 J. PRODS.
LIAB. 49, 49 & 53-54 (1981).
96. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011, slip op.
at 6 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981). See also notes 94 & 95 and accompanying text supra.
97. See 633 F.2d at 1225 n.27. The Sixth Circuit departed from the ac-
,cepted rule that "the burden to show coverage is on the insured". Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
10971980-811
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manufacturer as being on the risk for each of the years in which a worker
was exposed to asbestosis." 98 The Sixth Circuit, in reversing the ordi-
nary burden of proof on the insured to show coverage, 99 relied on this
confusing language.1 00 It is suggested that the court obfuscated the
burden of proof issue by use of such inappropriate terms as "the manu-
facturer", rather than "the insurance company", as being on the risk,' 0'
and that a worker was exposed to "asbestosis", where the court meant
"asbestos fiber" or "asbestos products". 102
Moreover the court's shifting of the burden of proof from the in-
sured to its casualty insurer is not necessary.103 Judge Keith concluded
that where "an insurance company can show that a certain manufac-
turer's products were not or could not have been involved for certain
years, it will be absolved from paying its pro rata share for those
years". 04 It is submitted that this determination would be made in the
underlying tort action, and where there was no exposure to the manu-
facturer's products, nonsuit or summary judgment in favor of the manu-
facturer is appropriate.'05  Further, the Sixth Circuit apparently con-
fused the carrier's obligation to defend with its duty to indemnify. The
former exists on the part of each insurer which carries products liability
coverage during the period of time the worker was exposed to its in-
98. Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
99. See notes 103 & 104 and accompanying text infra.
100. 633 F.2d at 1225 n.27.
101. Id.
102. Id. See also Mehaltty, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 F. 341, 342-
45 (Winter 1980). Asbestosis, by definition, is pulmonary fibrosis produced by
the inhalation of asbestos fibers. Id. at 343. Thus, it is submitted that the
Sixth Circuit's loose use of language confuses their argument in support of a
reversal of the burden of proof. See id.
The Sixth Circuit also referred to the Borel case in support of its reversal
of the burden of proof. See 633 F.2d at 1225-26 n.27. However, Borel imposed
joint and several liability upon manufacturers in the underlying lawsuits in
order to determine which manufacturers would be liable for the plaintiff's in-
juries. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-86 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). This issue is separate from the issue of
whether the manufacturer was insured during the years that the plaintiff-worker
alleges he was exposed. The date of exposure is to be determined during dis-
covery or at the trial of the underlying product liability lawsuit and not in the
declaratory judgment proceedings.
103. See notes 104-106 and accompanying text infra. For the court's reasons
supporting the shift of the burden of proof to the insurer, see 633 F.2d at 1225-
26 n.27.
104. 633 F.2d at 1225-26 n.27. The court stated that in most cases, it is
impossible to ascertain which company provided asbestos products in different
years, and accordingly, shifting the burden of proof to the insurer is the fairest
way to apportion liability. Id.
105. See, e.g., Carollo v. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc., 252 Pa. Super. Ct.
422, 427-32, 381 A.2d 990, 992-94 (1977) (grant of summary judgment in favor
of manufacturers is justified where uncontroverted affidavit shows no asbestos
fibers were exposed).
[VOL. 26: p. 10801098
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sured's products,106 and the latter is triggered only upon a finding of tort
liability of the manufacturer in the underlying personal injury lawsuit. 10 7
In addition, the policy repercussions of placing the burden of com-
pensating the injured on insurance companies must be mentioned. The
dissent accurately notes that accident costs can be minimized where the
burden is placed upon those best able to evaluate the risks of hazardous
activities.108 The dissent further suggested that an insurer will see that
the products of the insured pose some risks, and thus correspondingly
raise the premiums.' 0 9 An increase in premiums would create a direct
and immediate incentive for the insureds to maintain safer workplaces."o
However, experience has shown that carriers increase the deductible
rather than raise the premium."' These increases correspond to the
present uncertainty as to which coverage theory a court will use. A
higher deductible, while of some value, is not as effective an incentive to
create a safer workplace as is a higher premium," 2 since an insured
generally thinks about deductibles only after a claim has been made
against him. 13 The exposure theory of liability, however, takes away
the need for either extremely high deductibles or premiums, by spread-
ing the risk 114 and thus increasing the incentive for insurers to encour-
age manufacturers to maintain a safe workplace while it is on the risk.115
The greatest impact of the instant decision will be found in the
court's resolution of the extent of an insurer's duty to indemnify its
106. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011, slip op. at 7
(D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981). See also Note, supra note 79, at 473-90. In defending
claims against its insured, the carriers will need to prove that the manufacturer's
products did not contribute to the worker's injuries at any time. See Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-86 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
107. The general rule that the burden of proving coverage is on the insured
is a contract principle and is usually determined in a declaratory judgment
proceeding. See 46 C.J.S., Insurance § 1316 (Supp. 1981). See also Crown Cork
& Seal, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Sept. Term, 1978, No. 1292, slip op. at 1
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 9, 1980); note 99, supra.
108. 633 F.2d at 1231-32 (Merritt, J., dissenting). Judge Merritt reasoned
that "[t]he more 'early' insurers that are liable upon a victim's exposure, the
more likely it is that the potential harm will be discovered and the public
warned". Id. at 1231 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
109. Id. The dissent further stated that this action on the part of the
carrier may result in the manufacturer terminating such hazardous activities
and removing the product from the market. Id.
110. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 57, at 69-94.
111. 633 F.2d at 1215-16 n.6. Thus, rather than raising the premium to
encourage reduction of hazardous activities, the manufacturer will as a practical
matter, remain uninsured for asbestos disease cases.
112. See id.
113. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 57, at 69-94.
114. See notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra.
115. See Melhatty, supra note 102, at 352.
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insured in a latent disease case.116 The effect of employing an exposure
theory of liability will ensure that a manufacturer presently has insur--
ance coverage to protect its interests in the personal injury tort actions.
brought against it.1 " In terms of long-range effects, the exposure theory
will cause insurers to fully evaluate the nature of their insured's activities.
in order to gauge future tort responsibility for injuries caused while it
is on the risk, but which are manifested at a later date.118 It is sub--
mitted that when a similar long-term carcinogen case or factual situation
arises in the future, the courts can impose the financial burden on those,
carriers that did not investigate its insured's activities.11 9
Vincent Richard McGuinness, Jr..
116. See notes 65-78 & 91-93 and accompanying text supra. The court's,
adoption of the exposure rule has been followed by other courts. See Porter v.
American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981); Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. America, No. 78-1011, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1981).
117. See notes 106-07 and accompanying text supra.
118. See notes 94-96 & 108-115 and accompanying text supra.
119. Id. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Corp. of N. America, No. 78-1011,
slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 1981). See also notes 57 & 58 and accompanying
text supra.
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